We examine the impact of a stylized pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) Social Security program in an economy of overlapping generations with equilibrium growth. We adopt realistic mortality and other demographic assumptions and allow for the presence or absence of full life annuities. In all cases we find that steady state economies with PAYGO Social Security programs grow more slowly than those without. Also, we find that, for steady state economies having the same wage rate at the current time, initial all-inclusive wealth and lifetime expected utility are lower for households newly entering the economy with Social Security, and for all households subsequent. Growth and welfare are lower in economies without annuities, but the quantitative impact depends on how the financial wealth of decedents is distributed across the surviving population. With or without annuities, the presence of a PAYGO Social Security program reduces growth and welfare.
Introduction
The impact of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) Social Security programs on growth and welfare, as well as on the tax rate required for such programs to remain solvent, is of perennial policy interest.
Because such programs substitute intergenerational tax-transfers for saving and investment in productive capital, they are presumed to be detrimental to long-term productivity growth, barring other impacts they may have, such as on fertility. At the same time, by providing a life annuity of fixed purchasing power, Social Security programs provide consumption insurance to elderly households, and should therefore be expected to enhance lifetime welfare in economies with annuity market failure.
By their nature, the terms of PAYGO Social Insurance programs depend on demographic aspects, such as life expectancy and fertility, and labor market characteristics, such as retirement plans and Social Security claiming ages. Demographic trends, such as an ageing population, also have important implications for the sustainability of PAYGO Social Security. In this paper we examine the impacts of a stylized PAYGO Social Security program in a model of equilibrium growth with overlapping generations and realistic household mortality. We derive quantitative estimates of the impact of such programs on long-term growth and welfare, and numerically simulate the effects of different demographic and labor supply conditions on the terms required for the long-run solvency of PAYGO Social Security.
The use of overlapping generations (OLG) models to analyze the effects of PAYGO Social
Security has a long history dating back to the pioneering work of Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) . The discrete time, two-period canonical models of Samuelson and Diamond have been extended to include many periods, and other generalizations. In addition, there is a literature analyzing PAYGO Social Security using the continuous time models of Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1987) .
1 Assuming a constant mortality hazard rate (an exponential survival function), these models have proven to be highly tractable and informative. Their main shortcoming, however, is an unrealistic demographic structure, implying the existence of an excessively long tail of very old 1 The first paper to address Social Security using the Blanchard framework is Saint-Paul (1992) .
In this paper we introduce a PAYGO Social Security system into the computational demographic endogenous growth model developed by Bruce and Turnovsky (2012) . 4 Our analysis is conducted numerically, with preference and production parameters assigned values consistent with those characterizing the US and other Western economies. In order to focus attention on the demographic aspects, we assume output is produced using a Romer (1986) technology, thereby ensuring that the economy is always on its balanced growth path. We do not address transitional dynamics, such as would arise when a Social Security program is introduced or modified in an economy. Such events have differential effects on different cohorts, depending upon their ages, and generate a transitory period of dynamic adjustment. For this reason, the comparisons we undertake with regard to the effects of Social Security should be viewed as pertaining to two economies after all transitional effects have been fully worked through.
A key element of the mortality structure introduced in the Blanchard model is the existence of actually-fair life annuities, which provide a mechanism whereby the financial wealth of decedents is recycled to the survivors in the economy. To preserve comparability with the existing literature, we begin by maintaining this assumption. However, it is useful, particularly in assessing the welfare impact of Social Security, to consider a more realistic situation of annuities market failure. 5 We consider an economy that lacks annuities markets altogether, so households fully invest their financial wealth in capital, and when they die they leave accumulated financial capital as unintended bequests. The nature of the equilibrium, and how it is affected by Social Security, depends upon how 4 In this paper, we modify the survival function adopted in our previous study from the de Moivre function to the generalization of the Blanchard function proposed by Boucekkine et al, henceforth denoted the BCL survival function. The BCL function is not only more tractable but also matches well the empirical data on survival across age. The reason for this, as we show later, is that the BCL function is a first-order approximation to the Gompertz (1825) survival function, which is known to fit the human mortality data very well. 5 Several authors have addressed the role of annuities markets in addressing issues pertaining to life-cycle consumption and growth, though focusing on different aspects. For example, Bütler (2001) develops a stylized partial-equilibrium model of life cycle consumption and shows how the absence of annuities generates hump-saved consumption behavior. Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2008) analyze the consequences of the absence of an annuities market for life-cycle consumption behavior in a general equilibrium framework. While they incorporate a simple unfunded Social Security system, their equilibrium is one of exogenous growth. Heijdra and Mierau (2012) introduce annuity market imperfections in an endogenous growth framework, but do not incorporate a Social Security system. The latter two papers also demonstrate how the lack of annuities markets can generate hump-shaped consumption behavior over the life-cycle. 4 these unintended bequests are reallocated across survivors. We consider two plausible schemes, which we show to have different quantitative effects on growth and welfare.
Using this framework we obtain the following results. We emphasize that while they are obtained for a plausible calibration, we have conducted extensive sensitivity analysis and find them to be robust. We begin by comparing a benchmark steady-state economy having full actuarially-fair life annuities and a Social Security program comparable to that in the United States, to a steady-state economy without Social Security. We find that labor productivity in the latter economy grows about 71 basis points faster than in the benchmark economy, at 2.19% rather than 1.48%. This agrees qualitatively with other studies, adopting less comprehensive demographic structures, and is not surprising since the PAYGO system reduces saving in productive capital. We also find that the lifetime expected utility of a newborn household (that is, a household entering the economy) is higher in the steady-state economy without Social Security.
Life expectancy at age 65 has been increasing at about one year per decade. This represents a substantial increase, and it is therefore important to understand its consequences for economic growth and for the solvency of PAYGO Social Security. We find that with or without Social Security, an increase in longevity at age 65 raises the growth rate modestly and increases the tax rate required for PAYGO Social Security to remain solvent. Also, with enhanced longevity, Social Security has a marginally greater negative impact on growth. The increase in longevity also raises the question of increasing the retirement and claiming age for Social Security. We show that an increase of one year in the retirement/claiming age more than compensates for the increase in tax rate needed to maintain solvency given the increase in life expectancy, but lowers the growth rate slightly. This suggests that the effect of the anticipated length of the retirement period on the savings motive is important. An alternative method of maintaining solvency in response to increased longevity is to reduce the Social Security benefit rate. When this rate is reduced to attain the same reduction in the tax rate achieved by increasing the retirement/claiming age, growth rates are modestly higher.
In economies lacking annuities markets, where agents must invest their financial assets entirely in physical capital, the equilibrium depends upon how unintended bequests are allocated 5 across the surviving population. We consider two natural schemes, which are shown to lead to different outcomes. The first, which we call a "normalized" scheme, assumes that survivors receive lump-sum transfers equal to the mortality interest payment they would have received if life annuities existed. In this normalized case, the growth rate is significantly lower than in an economy with annuities, and Social Security reduces the growth rate by about the same amount. We also find that welfare is lower in the economy without annuities, but the presence of a Social Security program has no welfare enhancing role. Under the second allocation scheme, when decedent wealth is distributed to newborn households as initial financial wealth, which we use as a proxy for unintended bequests to progeny, the growth rate is somewhat higher than for the normalized economy (but below that of the economy with annuities), and the impact of Social Security on growth is attenuated.
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The absence of annuities does, however, have important consequences for the lifetime consumption profile of households. In contrast to the annuities economy, which implies that consumption grows indefinitely with age, an economy without annuities exhibits a more empirically plausible hump-shaped consumption-age profile, where agents increase consumption during the early phase of their life cycle and reduce it later, consistent with the previous findings of Bütler (2001) , Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2008) and Heijdra and Mierau (2012) . The introduction of Social Security is shown to reduce consumption at each age, implying an unambiguous reduction in utility.
However, at a point in time, Social Security has a significant impact on the cross-section age profile of consumption. Consumption initially increases with age in cross section for the economy with Social Security, before declining at old age.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the demographic structure and its impact on household behavior in the case of full annuities. Section 3 derives the resulting macroeconomic equilibrium. As noted, our analysis is based on numerical simulations and Section 4 discusses the parameterizations and calibrations. Section 5 analyzes the effects of Social Security in an economy with annuities, while Section 6 discusses the implications when annuities are absent. Our main results are summarized and assessed in Section 7.
6
The Utility-Maximizing Household
In this section, we develop the life-cycle consumption-saving behavior of a mortal household. We shall assume that the survival function is independent of calendar time and let   Sz denote the probability at birth of the household surviving to age z. Because survival declines with age, ( ) 0
where  denotes the maximum attainable age.
Using this notation,     S z S x is the probability of surviving to age z, conditional on surviving to age x, while ( ) ( ) S z S z   is the mortality hazard rate at age z.
The First-order Conditions
A household of age x, at time t, maximizes its expected utility over the remainder of its life:
where  is the pure time discount rate,   u  is the instantaneous utility function, and
cz  is its planned consumption at age z which occurs at time t+z-x. 7 The household's flow budget constraint at age z and time t is
where, for a household of age z at time t,   In introducing a demographic structure, it is important to distinguish calendar time, denoted by the time subscript, from age, which is indexed in parentheses. 8 We assume that () Lz is specified exogenously, as do Blanchard and Fischer (1989) , who assume that () Lz declines at an exponential rate. While the function, () Lz , can be quite general, allowing for either abrupt or gradual "retirement", we assume that it does not vary with (calendar) time. By treating labor supply as exogenous we are unable to address the impact of social security on retirement, an important issue addressed in early papers by Feldstein (1974) , Sheshinski (1978) , and Crawford and Lilien (1981) , and more recently by Pestieau (2004, 2008) .
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Optimizing the present value Hamiltonian
with respect to () 
Equation (3a) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow value of financial wealth, while (3b) equates the rate of return on consumption, modified by the mortality hazard rate, to the rate of return on financial assets. Following much of contemporary growth literature, we assume an iso-elastic instantaneous utility function of the form
the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. This enables us to rewrite (3b), describing how consumption changes with age, as
In addition to equation (4), the first-order conditions of the household include a transversality condition specified in (3c) below.
Initially, we follow Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965) by assuming that households invest wholly in actuarially-fair life annuities. In Section 6 we also consider the case in which there is no market for life annuities. Under the production conditions introduced in Section 3.4, the risk-free rate of return on physical capital is fixed at r. In the case of life annuities, the interest rate on the financial asset depends on the household's age, but not on time, so
where r is the risk-free rate of return on capital and
is the annuity mortality hazard premium for a household at age z. With uncertain mortality, households may die holding financial wealth. With actuarially fair annuities, the wealth of the dying is recycled to survivors as the mortality interest premium.
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Given the above, we now write
which we may solve to obtain
where   , R z x is the discount factor for a flow at age z to a household at age x.
Combining (4) and (5) yields
Equation (4') indicates that when a household fully invests in actuarially fair annuities, consumption increases with age at a rate that is constant, and independent of both age and wealth. We can now express the transversality condition for the agent having a maximum lifespan of  as
The Household's Consumption Plan
To derive the household's consumption plan, we begin by integrating (4') to obtain
We then express the budget constraint (1b) in the equivalent form as
In the case of annuities, the lump-sum transfer
is set equal to zero throughout. Integrating (1b') forward at age z and using the transversality condition, (3c), we obtain the agent's intertemporal budget constraint applicable from age x at time t as
where   t fx is the household's financial wealth and   t hx is the household's non-financial wealth, including both its human and Social Security wealth. In particular,
We will call the sum of the household's financial and non-financial wealth its "all-inclusive" wealth.
Substituting equation (6) for
in equation (7), the household's consumption at age x can be
where   mx denotes the household's time independent marginal (and average) propensity to consume out of its all-inclusive wealth at age x, and is defined as
That is, at time t a household of age x consumes a fraction   mx of its all-inclusive wealth.
We now assume that the productivity of labor increases over calendar time at a constant rate g (to be determined in equilibrium as the "economic growth rate" or "productivity growth rate".) This market wage is economy-wide and common to all households, regardless of their birth dates.
Thus the market wage at time t can be expressed
where tx w  is the wage rate prevailing in the economy at the time a household of age x is born (enters the economy).
To preserve tractability, we adopt a stylized form of Social Security benefit, where
That is, a household's Social Security benefit is equal to a timeindependent fraction  (the replacement rate) of the earnings foregone as a result of the reduced 9 Note that for the infinitely-lived household with logarithmic utility ( ( ) 1, , 0 Sz      ), the marginal propensity to consume wealth in (9c) is just the familiar constant ρ.
labor supply due to "retirement". 10 The assumption that the program parameters  and  are timeindependent for a PAYGO Social Security program is validated later. Substituting for   t bz into the expression for () t hx, defined in (8), the non-financial wealth of a household of age x at time t can be expressed as
hx, a time-independent present value factor, is
The present value factor reflects the Social Security parameters, the growth rate of wages, the return on capital, the age-dependent labor supply function, and the age dependent survival function.
We assume a household enters the economy with no financial wealth. Using
, and
we can write
The Utility of an Entering Household
Substituting equation (6) into (1a), and using the iso-elastic form of the instantaneous utility function, we can express the expected lifetime utility of a household newly entering the economy at time t as a multiple u of the economy-wide wage rate at time t, that is,
We report the utility multiplier u in a discussion of the welfare effects of Social Security.
The Aggregate Economy
To derive aggregate variables we must sum over the cohorts in the economy. 

. Given the time-invariance of the survival function, the total population also grows at rate n.
Aggregate Household Variables
We now use the demographic structure to obtain the key aggregate economic variables:
aggregate labor supply, consumption, and financial wealth.
Aggregate labor supply, L t , at time t is obtained by summing the labor supply across all cohorts, that is,
where
is a time-independent coefficient.
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Aggregate consumption at time t is
. Using equation (11) we obtain
is time independent.
Aggregate non-financial wealth is
Aggregate financial wealth at time t is 
, we can substitute (9b) and (11) to obtain
We can use (15) and (16) 
The right-hand side of (17) is time-independent, while aggregate consumption t C and aggregate 13 financial wealth t F grow at the rate gn  . The values of the time-independent coefficients ,, (14) through (17) depend upon the taste parameters  and  , the population growth rate n, the productivity growth rate g, the rate of return on capital r, the Social Security parameters τ and β, and the forms of the demographic functions.
The Demographic Constraint
The number of deaths at time t of persons of age x is
the total number of deaths equals
denote the fertility or birth rate by individuals of age x, so the number of births at time t to persons of age x is
. Then, the total number of births equals 
Equation (18) represents a demographic "adding-up" constraint relating the population growth rate and the survival and fertility functions. When computing the impact of Social Security under different demographic conditions, we make use of this constraint. 
The Government Budget Constraint
The government sector consists solely of the Social Security program, which is financed on a . Thus, the PAYGO Social Security budget constraint as 12 We should note that (18) assumes that the demographic structure is in steady state.
Equation (19) determines the social security tax rate τ required by PAYGO funding as equal to the social security benefit replacement rate  times the "dependency ratio". Note that this constraint implies that the Social Security parameters are time-independent, validating our earlier assumption.
The Aggregate Production Sector
In deriving the behavior of the household, we have assumed that the rate of return on capital and the growth rate of labor productivity are constant over time, and together with the prevailing wage rate, are exogenous to the household. To complete the model and determine the equilibrium, 
where A is the total factor productivity term, t k denotes the firm's capital stock,  is the depreciation rate, and tt KL is the economy-wide capital-labor ratio. This last term provides the production externality that ensures that the equilibrium productivity of capital remains constant, thereby enabling the economy to sustain a constant equilibrium growth rate.
Assuming each firm is small enough to ignore its own impact on the economy-wide values of 13 If the underlying production function is neoclassical, these quantities would be time varying and this would need to be taken into account by the household sector in its decision-making process. 14 While Romer (1986) specified the production function as Cobb-Douglas, the crucial properties we obtain apply to any linearly homogeneous production function of the form ( , ) 15 t K and t L , and because firms are identical, in equilibrium t t t k K L  and the equilibrium rate of return on capital is given by its marginal product
which is constant over time, while the equilibrium wage at time t is given by LB    into (21b), we show that the time independent aggregator terms must satisfy the following equality:
Aggregate output at time t , denoted t Q , is equal to tt Lq  . Using (20) and
The production side of the economy is fully described by equations (20) to (22).
Closing the System
The final step in determining the equilibrium growth rate, g, is to require that the aggregate household variables be consistent with the aggregate production variables. In the conventional
Romer model, the equilibrium growth rate is obtained directly from the goods market equilibrium condition 15 This equality follows from the assumption of a linear homogeneous production function. (19) implicitly solve for the balanced growth rate. The demographic constraint (18) is used to determine consistent demographic parameters.
The Parameterized Demographic Functions
In order to evaluate the coefficients , CL    and the constraints (18) and (19), we parameterize the demographic functions . This in turn, can be 16 As we acknowledge in our previous paper, Bruce and Turnovsky (2012) , there is a literature demonstrating how the demographic structure may be dependent upon the economic conditions. 
We also assume the labor supply fraction declines in accordance with a BCL form, namely
where is the oldest age for which a worker remains in the labor force and
Substituting the parametric forms, we summarize the full equations for the full annuities case in Appendix A. The equilibrium growth rate g is obtained by substituting (A2)-(A5) into the goods market clearing condition, (A1), and solving for g. Social Security parameters  and  must satisfy (A6). Demographic parameters must satisfy (A7) where, for simplicity, we assume the fertility rate  is independent of age. The utility multiplier is determined by (A8).
Calibration
Because the production and preference characteristics of the economy are standard and well documented in the literature, we maintain the following values throughout our analysis.   (that is, an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution equal to 0.5).
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We calibrate the two parameters of the survival function based on the US Life Tables for the Social Security Area (Bell and Miller, 2005) . In 2010, remaining life expectancy for women of age 17 The only point to note is that  , being a pure rate of time preference, is somewhat smaller than the conventional value for the representative agent model ( 0.04
 
). This is because the latter implicitly discount for mortality factors, which we are explicitly incorporating in our analysis. . We assume the population growth rate is 1%.
Computing the Effects of Social Security on Growth
We compute equilibrium growth rates for calibrated values of the Social Security parameters  and  under different demographic conditions using a Mathematica coded program that is available from the authors on request. In our earlier paper (Bruce and Turnovsky (2012)), we found that the equilibrium growth rate of the model is unique. We choose a benchmark case of realistic calibration, and compare steady-state economies with and without Social Security, and with and without annuities. Solutions in economies with annuities are less time consuming to compute, so we use this case to examine the effects of different demographic assumptions, as well as some Social Security reforms which have been suggested to maintain PAYGO solvency.
The Effects of Social Security with Full Annuities-the Benchmark Case.
Line 1 of Table 1 describes the simulated values for a benchmark steady state economy that has a PAYGO Social Security program with a replacement rate of 30% of covered earnings, similar to the US program. 20 As seen in the table, the productivity growth rate in the economy without Social Security is higher by 71 basis points (bps), being 2.19% rather than 1.48%, than for the 18 We use women because the Social Security benefit is a dual survival annuity, and the majority of beneficiaries are married. 19 Mierau and Turnovsky (2011) fit the BCL function to US 2006 cohort data for persons over age 18 using non-linear least-squares. The resulting estimates track the data well, except at the extreme old-age tail. In particular, the Mierau and Turnovsky estimates imply a maximum age of survival (  ) of 95.1 years, a life expectancy at age 18 of 60.4 years, and
.0566
 
. 20 The Social Security replacement rate for a worker with average income who does not claim until the age of full entitlement is nearly 40%. However, a majority of workers claim a reduced benefit at an earlier age, which reduces the average replacement rate.
19 steady-state economy with Social Security. The payroll tax rate required for PAYGO solvency is 10.18%, which is approximately the FICA tax rate needed to finance current OASDI benefits at full employment in the U.S. program. The implied dependency ratio (dependents per covered worker) is 33.9%, which is close to the actual current (2010) OASDI dependency ratio of 34%.
To make welfare comparisons, we normalize the wage rate to unity at the current time for both economies. 21 In the table, we report the initial wealth multiplier for a household entering the economy at the current time. 22 As can be seen in the Table, the initial wealth multiplier is 18%
higher in the economy without Social Security economy, at 17.4 rather than 14.7. We also report the utility multiplier as given by equation (12). The utility multiplier, and hence the lifetime expected utility of a newborn household, is 15.5% higher in the economy without Social Security economy, at -20.1 rather than -23.8. Because the growth rate is also higher in the economy without Social Security, the expected lifetime utilities of all future households are higher as well.
The Effect of Longer Life Expectancy
In Table 2 Life expectancy could increase either due to reduced mortality hazard over remaining life (an increase in the parameter  ) or an increase in the oldest survival age (parameter  ). Since the oldest survival age has increased very little, in Table 2 we augment life expectancy at age 65 by one year, from 84.1 to 85.1, by increasing the parameter  from .056 to .073.
With a constant birth rate, an increase in life expectancy at age 65 of one year would increase the population growth rate from 1% to 1.16% according to the demographic constraint. We assume the expected claiming/retirement age remains 63. From Table 2 , we see that in the steady-state economy with longer life expectancy the economic growth rate with Social Security is slightly higher (+6 bps) than in the benchmark case. The increase in the growth rate for the economy without 21 The qualitative results obtain if the wage rate in the steady state economy without Social Security is greater than or equal to that of the Social Security economy at any time prior to the current period. Since the growth rate in the steady state economy without Social Security is greater, this is a reasonable assumption. 22 The initial wealth multiplier times the current wage is equal to the initial wealth of the entering household.
Social Security is slightly greater (+74 bps) than in the benchmark case. The PAYGO solvent tax rate is 35 bps higher, because the dependency ratio is increased from 33.9% to 35.1%.
The Effect of a Higher Average Claiming/Retirement Age
By imposing the balanced budget (19), we are assuming that the PAYGO Social Security scheme is solvent. However, we can analyze the consequences of demographic or policy changes on PAYGO solvency by considering their effects on the tax rate needed for the system to remain solvent following the change. Specifically, we consider a steady-state economy with augmented life expectancy together with an average retirement/claiming age that is augmented by one year. To increase the expected retirement/claiming age, conditional on survival, from 63 to 64 (as of age 0), the labor supply shape parameter  is changed from .059 to 0.0651. In Table 3 we see that the resulting PAYGO solvent tax rate in the Social Security economy with the augmented life expectancy and retirement/claiming age is reduced from 10.18% to 9.77%. This is possible because of the reduction in the dependency ratio (32.6%). In other words, a one year increase in life expectancy at age 65, together with a comparable increase in the average retirement/claiming age, is more than enough to maintain steady-state Social Security solvency for a given benefit rate. The economic growth rate is modestly lower with and without Social Security, and the increase in the growth rate for the economy without Social Security slightly smaller (+69 bps.)
The Effect of Increased Fertility
Some analysts claim that PAYGO Social Security solvency problems can be eliminated, or at least mitigated, by other policies that promote higher economic growth. In our model, and we expect in practice as well, a higher steady-state economic growth rate has no impact on the tax rate required for PAYGO solvency because faster economic growth increases both the growth rate of revenue and benefits. However, a higher population growth rate does reduce the tax rate required for PAYGO solvency providing the higher population growth rate is due to a higher fertility rate (or, equivalently, a higher rate of inflow of young workers from immigration.) 23 In Table 4 we consider a steady-state economy with augmented life expectancy, but with a population growth rate that is 1.3% rather than 1.16% because of a higher birth rate (2.39% rather than 2.3%). The dependency ratio is lower (33.7% rather than 35.1%) in the economy with faster population growth, and the tax rate needed for PAYGO solvency is 10.12%. Thus, an increase in the birth rate by 9 bps roughly offsets an increase of one year in life expectancy (at age 65) on the tax rate required for PAYGO Social Security solvency. 
The Effect of Reducing the Benefit Rate
Finally, in Table 5 , we consider a steady-state economy in which the increased life expectancy is accompanied by reducing the Social Security benefit rate from 30% to 29%. The lower replacement rate is chosen so as to reduce the solvent PAYGO tax rate to 10.18%, the tax rate in the benchmark case. In this case, we compensate for a one year increase in life expectancy with a cut in the benefit rate of one percentage point. Note, however, that the growth rate is slightly higher (+9 bps) than in the benchmark case.
Social Security and Growth in an Economy without Annuities
In the previous section, we examined the effects of Social Security in a steady-state economy where households fully invest their financial wealth in actuarially fair life annuities. However, the existence of a Social Security program is often justified as a response to market failure in annuities markets. For this reason, it should not be surprising that Social Security reduces lifetime utility when the economy already has full life annuities. There is no particular welfare rationale for the program, and the program reduces growth by reducing saving and investment in productive capital. Comparing (4'') and (6') with (4') and (6), we see that in the absence of annuities, households choose a different consumption profile than in the fully annuitized case. In the latter case, household consumption increases exponentially with age provided r   as is conventionally assumed. From (4'') it is evident that the rate of consumption increase as the household ages is reduced by the mortality hazard rate (
. Moreover, since the mortality hazard rate increases with age, in fact and according to the survival function used in this paper, household consumption reaches a maximum, and then declines for households of very old age. We discuss the effect of Social Security on the age-consumption profile further in section 6.3.
As mentioned, households leave unintended bequests in the absence of life annuities, and the equilibrium outcomes depend on how these unintended bequests are recycled across the surviving population. The financial wealth left by decedent households at time t is equal to
. We consider two different schemes for distributing this financial wealth. The first, which we call the "normalized" scheme, assumes that surviving households of age z receive a lump-sum transfer equal to the mortality interest premium that they would have received on life annuities. That is,
, it is apparent that the financial wealth left by decedents 23 is fully recycled in this normalized scheme. 25 The second scheme, which we call the "childinheritance scheme", assumes that the financial wealth of the decedents at each time is fully distributed as a per capita financial inheritance to households entering the economy at that time.
(Under the normalized scheme, households enter the economy without initial financial wealth, as in the annuities case.)
Social Security in the Normalized Scheme
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We now aggregate and parameterize as before. The equations for the parameterized model with no annuities in the normalized scheme are summarized in Appendix B. Equations (B2) to (B5) are substituted into (B1) to solve for the growth rate as a function of calibrated parameter values with and without Social Security. The Social Security parameters must satisfy (B6). The utility multiplier is given by (B8).
The effect of introducing a Social Security program with a replacement rate (  ) of 30% is shown using the benchmark demographic calibration. First note that in the normalized scheme the economy without annuities grows at a slower rate than the economy with annuities, with or without Social Security. In the normalized Social Security economy without annuities, the growth rate is 1.04%, which is 44 bps less than in the benchmark economy. In the normalized economy without Social Security, the growth rate is 70 bps higher, roughly the same effect as in the benchmark economy.
Both the wealth and utility multipliers are smaller in the normalized economy without annuities, so if the economies have the same wage rate at the present time or earlier, households entering the economy have lower expected lifetime utility in economies without annuities in the normalized scheme. Because the growth rate is also less without annuities, subsequent households entering the economy have lower lifetime utilities as well. However, a PAYGO Social Security program does not improve welfare even in an economy without annuities since both the utility and wealth multipliers are smaller.
A possible reason why Social Security does not improve welfare in an economy without annuities is because recycled decedent wealth functions as an implicit annuity in the normalized scheme. In this scheme, households receive the same transfers they do in the annuities economy but as age-dependent lump sum transfers rather than as interest on financial wealth. However, the transfers continue as long as the household lives, effectively functioning as a type of life annuity. In the child-inheritance scheme of section 6.2, we consider the case where decedent wealth is recycled as an initial financial inheritance received with certainty (and finality) by households entering the economy. This eliminates the "implicit" life annuity that is present in the normalized scheme.
6.2
Social Security in the Child-Inheritance Scheme
The right-hand side of (26) is independent of time, so   0 t f increases at the productivity growth rate as assumed. We now aggregate and parameterize as before. The parameterized model with no annuities in the child inheritance scheme is summarized in Appendix C. Equations (C2) to (C5) are substituted into (C1) to solve for the growth rate as a function of calibrated parameter values with and without Social Security. The Social Security parameters satisfy (C.6) and the utility multiplier is given by (C8).
The effect of Social Security in the benchmark steady-state economies without annuities and with child inheritance are shown in Table 7 . With Social Security, the growth rate is 1.31% which is 27 bps higher than in the normalized economy. In a similar economy without Social Security the growth rate is 58 bps higher at 1.89%. As compared to the normalized scheme, the utility and initial wealth multipliers are higher in inheritance economy, but are the same or lower than those of the benchmark annuities economy. Because the growth rate is lower in the inheritance economy without annuities, households subsequently entering the economy receive lower lifetime utilities.
Again we find that the steady-state economy with Social Security has lower growth and 27 lower utility despite the (now, complete) absence of annuities. However, the differences are attenuated. The economy without Social Security grows only 58 bps faster as compared to 71 bps for the benchmark, and the utility multiplier in the economy without Social Security is 12.6% higher, as compared to 15.5% higher in the benchmark case. It appears that the negative impact of Social Security on the growth rate of the economy dominates the annuity benefits from the program.
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Social Security and the Age Profile of Consumption
Consumption over the life-cycle is known to exhibit a characteristic hump or inverse-U profile (See Gourinchas and Parker (2002) , Bullard and Feigenbaum (2003) and, more recently, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007)). This profile is not obtained in the annuities model, because consumption rises or falls monotonically with age depending on whether r   is positive or negative, but it is present in the economy without annuities. This follows directly from equations (4') and (6') due to a rising mortality hazard rate.
In Figure 1 we simulate the implied age profile for an individual household (we assume a unit wage rate at the time the household enters the economy) with and without Social Security using the benchmark calibration for the normalized economy without annuities. 27 Given the parameters of the base case, utility rises steadily with age but drops sharply when the household attains very old age (about 60 years after it enters the economy, or 80 years old.) Consumption then declines sharply to zero. 28 This profile is the same with or without Social Security, although the profile is flattened slightly in the Social Security case. With Social Security, consumption is lower at every age. This is because the initial wealth of the household is less in the Social Security economy. 26 We believe that this result reflects the fact that the standard annuities market failure argument for Social Security overstates the cost of annuities market failure. The standard insurance argument ignores implications for economic growth and recycled decedent wealth. In an economy without annuities and uncertain mortality, households are uninsured but save more and hold higher financial wealth stocks in accordance with the "buffer stock argument" (Carroll, 1997) . This greater financial capital which households "lose" when they die is not lost to the economy in aggregate, since it is recycled as unintended bequests. An important implication of our analysis is that the impact of this recycled financial wealth, for both growth and welfare, depends crucially on how bequests are distributed across the age distribution of surviving households. 27 Similar profiles are found for the child-inheritance economy without annuities. 28 Consumption falls to zero as the household approaches the maximum survival age because survival falls to zero. If we introduce a subsistence level of consumption, the pattern remains the same with consumption falling to the subsistence level, rather than zero, as the household approaches the oldest possible survival age.
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A more interesting profile, perhaps, is the cross section of consumption across age at a point in time shown in Figure 2 . Again, two economies are shown, one with Social Security and one without, at a given time. The wage is normalized at unity. In the economy without Social Security, consumption is level across younger households of different ages, and drops for households of very old age. In the Social Security economy, the cross section profile is significantly different. In the Social Security economy, consumption initially rises with age in cross section, again dropping for households of very old age. Also, in the cross section, young households have lower consumption in the Social Security economy than in the economy without Social Security. 29 However, after age 44
(24 years after the household enters the economy), consumption in the Social Security economy surpasses that of the economy without Social Security, and remains higher for the rest of the age distribution. One cannot draw welfare conclusions from this cross section because the wage grows faster in the economy without Social Security. Households who are currently younger will have higher consumption levels than currently older households when they reach similar ages. However, the profile suggests that a PAYGO Social Security program can have a marked effect on the observed age cross-section of consumption at a point in time, notably higher consumption by aged households as compared to an economy without Social Security.
Conclusions
This paper has addressed the effect of a PAYGO Social Security in an endogenous growth model of overlapping generations with a realistic demographic structure that has been shown to track that of the US (and other economies) rather closely. We have compared the effect of Social Security in economies with and without the presence of a fair life annuities market. Steady state economies with PAYGO Social Security programs grow more slowly than those without Social Security and, assuming the economies have the same wage rate at the current time, the initial all-inclusive wealth and lifetime expected utility are lower for households entering the economy and for all subsequent households. The effect of the absence of life annuities on the steady-state economy depends on how the financial wealth of decedents is distributed across the surviving population. When decedent 29 Again, we normalize the wage at the current time.
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wealth is distributed lump-sum across the population with the same age distribution as in an economy with full annuities, growth and utility are much lower in an economy without annuities.
However, when decedent wealth is distributed as initial financial wealth to the youngest households, growth and utility are modestly lower than in an economy with annuities. With or without annuities, the presence of a PAYGO Social Security reduces growth and welfare.
Our focus on balanced growth paths, originating back in the infinite past, while instructive, prevents us from addressing other important policy issues, where the transitional dynamics become important. One such issue pertains to changes in the financing of the Social Security system, such as moving from a PAYGO system, such as addressed here, to a fully funded system. Such a restructuring of the Social Security system inevitably requires introducing a specific starting date at which the structural change begins to take effect. In that case, different cohorts will be affected differently, depending upon where they are in their respective life cycles at that time, and this will introduce transitional dynamics, at least until the structural change has worked through all the current cohorts. This in turn raises interesting questions relating to the time horizon over which changes should be implemented. The longer they take, the more cohorts, including currently unborn, are potentially affected. These are important directions in which this paper could be usefully extended. 
